Harden request origin checks and configure allowed hosts

.env.example

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # Public website URL (HTTPS for hosted contributor pairing)
 MINEGEO_URL=http://localhost:3000
+# Bind to 0.0.0.0 when intentionally accessing a development server over the LAN.
+MINEGEO_HOST=127.0.0.1
+# Optional comma-separated exact public origins for a reverse proxy or aliases.
+MINEGEO_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
+# Testing only: true bypasses browser origin checks (including CSRF origin protection).
+MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=false
 NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=
 NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=
 # Server only. Never prefix this key with NEXT_PUBLIC_.

app/auth/callback/route.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
 import { authClient } from "@/lib/supabase";
+import { requestOrigin } from "@/lib/request-origin";
 export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  const origin = requestOrigin(request, process.env.MINEGEO_URL);
   const code = request.nextUrl.searchParams.get("code");
   if (code) {
     const client = await authClient();
     const { error } = await client.auth.exchangeCodeForSession(code);
-    if (!error)
-      return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", request.url));
+    if (!error) return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", origin));
   }
-  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard?auth=failed", request.url));
+  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard?auth=failed", origin));
 }

docs/local-network.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Using MineGeo on a Mac or another LAN server
+
+MineGeo validates browser requests against the hostname and port used to reach
+the server. The internal Next.js listening address can differ from that address.
+Supabase's email redirect settings do not configure MineGeo's origin validation.
+
+In the server's `.env.local`, set the public URL to the address you actually use.
+For example, if the Mac is `192.168.1.50` and MineGeo runs on port `3000`:
+
+```dotenv
+MINEGEO_URL=http://192.168.1.50:3000
+# Needed only if other devices access the Mac over the LAN:
+MINEGEO_HOST=0.0.0.0
+```
+
+Use your own IP address and port, then restart MineGeo. `MINEGEO_URL` also controls
+the browser pairing link generated for the capture tools.
+
+In Supabase **Authentication → URL Configuration**, use the same base address for
+the Site URL and add `http://192.168.1.50:3000/auth/callback` to Redirect URLs.
+MineGeo sends the current browser origin plus `/auth/callback` when requesting an
+email sign-in link. After changing redirect settings, request a fresh link.
+See [Supabase's redirect URL documentation](https://supabase.com/docs/guides/auth/redirect-urls).
+
+For a reverse proxy whose public scheme or hostname differs from the backend,
+set `MINEGEO_URL` to the public HTTPS URL. Additional exact origins can be listed
+in `MINEGEO_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, separated by commas. Arbitrary forwarded-host headers
+do not authorize additional origins.
+
+For a testing server reached through changing IP addresses, ports, or domains,
+add this to its `.env.local` and restart MineGeo:
+
+```dotenv
+MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=true
+```
+
+This bypasses MineGeo's browser origin checks, including their CSRF protection.
+The default is `false`; only the exact value `true` enables the bypass.
+Authentication, permissions, and JSON request requirements still apply. This
+setting controls MineGeo's API checks; Supabase email sign-in still needs allowed
+redirect URLs, and `MINEGEO_URL` still controls capture-tool pairing links.

lib/api.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { z } from "zod";
 import { admin, required, user } from "./supabase";
 import { datasetSchema, faces, difficulties } from "../shared/protocol";
 import { mediaUrl } from "./catalog";
+import { requestOrigin, verifyOrigin } from "./request-origin";
 const hash = (value: string) =>
   createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
 const idSchema = z.string().uuid();
@@ -91,21 +92,6 @@ async function jsonBody(request: NextRequest) {
   }
   return JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"));
 }
-function verifyOrigin(request: NextRequest) {
-  if (request.method === "GET" || request.method === "HEAD") return;
-  const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
-  const allowed = new Set([
-    new URL(request.url).origin,
-    process.env.MINEGEO_URL || "http://localhost:3000",
-  ]);
-  if (origin && !allowed.has(origin)) throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
-  if (
-    !origin &&
-    !request.headers.get("authorization") &&
-    !request.headers.get("content-type")?.includes("application/json")
-  )
-    throw new Error("JSON request required");
-}
 export async function handle(request: NextRequest, path: string[]) {
   try {
     verifyOrigin(request);
@@ -537,7 +523,7 @@ export async function handle(request: NextRequest, path: string[]) {
         return NextResponse.json({
           deviceCode,
           userCode: code,
-          verificationUri: `${process.env.MINEGEO_URL || new URL(request.url).origin}/pair?code=${code}`,
+          verificationUri: `${process.env.MINEGEO_URL ? new URL(process.env.MINEGEO_URL).origin : requestOrigin(request)}/pair?code=${code}`,
           interval: 5,
         });
       }
@@ -622,13 +608,13 @@ export async function handle(request: NextRequest, path: string[]) {
           .parse(await jsonBody(request));
         if (b.decision === "reject" && !b.reason?.trim())
           throw new Error("Provide a rejection reason");
-        const {error}=await client.rpc("publish_dataset", {
-            p_dataset: b.datasetId,
-            p_reviewer: reviewer,
-            p_decision: b.decision,
-            p_reason: b.reason ?? null,
-          });
-        if(error)throw new Error(error.message);
+        const { error } = await client.rpc("publish_dataset", {
+          p_dataset: b.datasetId,
+          p_reviewer: reviewer,
+          p_decision: b.decision,
+          p_reason: b.reason ?? null,
+        });
+        if (error) throw new Error(error.message);
         return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
       }
     }

lib/request-origin.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+type OriginRequest = Pick<Request, "url" | "headers" | "method">;
+type OriginConfiguration = {
+  websiteUrl?: string;
+  additionalOrigins?: string;
+  allowAnyOrigin?: boolean;
+};
+
+function parseOrigin(value: string): URL {
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(value);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
+  }
+  if (
+    !["http:", "https:"].includes(parsed.protocol) ||
+    parsed.username ||
+    parsed.password
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
+  }
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+const originOf = (value: string) => parseOrigin(value).origin;
+
+/** Next may build request.url using the listening address rather than the LAN host. */
+export function requestOrigin(
+  request: Pick<Request, "url" | "headers">,
+  websiteUrl?: string,
+): string {
+  const url = new URL(request.url);
+  const host = request.headers.get("host");
+  if (!host) return originOf(url.origin);
+  // Use the direct request's authority, including its port. Forwarded hosts are
+  // intentionally excluded; proxy deployments can configure their public URL.
+  if (/[\s/\\?#@,]/.test(host)) throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
+  const direct = parseOrigin(`${url.protocol}//${host}`);
+  // Preserve HTTPS when a configured public host terminates TLS at a proxy.
+  // A different configured host must not redirect a LAN login to localhost.
+  if (websiteUrl) {
+    const configured = parseOrigin(websiteUrl);
+    if (configured.host === direct.host) return configured.origin;
+  }
+  return direct.origin;
+}
+
+export function verifyOrigin(
+  request: OriginRequest,
+  configuration: OriginConfiguration = {
+    websiteUrl: process.env.MINEGEO_URL,
+    additionalOrigins: process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOWED_ORIGINS,
+    allowAnyOrigin: process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN === "true",
+  },
+) {
+  if (request.method === "GET" || request.method === "HEAD") return;
+  const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
+  if (origin !== null) {
+    if (configuration.allowAnyOrigin) return;
+    const parsed = parseOrigin(origin);
+    if (parsed.pathname !== "/" || parsed.search || parsed.hash) {
+      throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
+    }
+    const allowed = new Set([requestOrigin(request)]);
+    for (const value of [
+      configuration.websiteUrl,
+      ...(configuration.additionalOrigins?.split(",") ?? []),
+    ]) {
+      if (value?.trim()) allowed.add(originOf(value.trim()));
+    }
+    if (!allowed.has(originOf(origin)))
+      throw new Error("Invalid request origin");
+  } else if (
+    !request.headers.get("authorization") &&
+    !request.headers.get("content-type")?.includes("application/json")
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("JSON request required");
+  }
+}

tests/request-origin.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { requestOrigin, verifyOrigin } from "../lib/request-origin";
+const internalUrl = "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/tokens";
+const makeRequest = (
+  host: string,
+  origin?: string,
+  extra: Record<string, string> = {},
+) =>
+  new Request(internalUrl, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      host,
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      ...(origin === undefined ? {} : { origin }),
+      ...extra,
+    },
+  });
+
+test("the testing switch accepts any origin only when explicitly enabled", () => {
+  const request = makeRequest("localhost:3000", "https://test-domain.example");
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() => verifyOrigin(request, { allowAnyOrigin: true }));
+  for (const configuration of [{}, { allowAnyOrigin: false }]) {
+    assert.throws(
+      () => verifyOrigin(request, configuration),
+      /Invalid request origin/,
+    );
+  }
+});
+
+test("the environment switch requires the exact value true", () => {
+  const previous = process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN;
+  const request = makeRequest("localhost:3000", "https://test-domain.example");
+  try {
+    for (const value of [undefined, "false", "0", "TRUE", "true"]) {
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN;
+      else process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN = value;
+      if (value === "true") assert.doesNotThrow(() => verifyOrigin(request));
+      else assert.throws(() => verifyOrigin(request), /Invalid request origin/);
+    }
+  } finally {
+    if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN;
+    else process.env.MINEGEO_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN = previous;
+  }
+});
+
+test("the testing switch retains JSON checks for requests without an origin", () => {
+  assert.throws(
+    () =>
+      verifyOrigin(
+        new Request(internalUrl, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+        }),
+        { allowAnyOrigin: true },
+      ),
+    /JSON request required/,
+  );
+});
+
+test("accepts a Mac LAN origin when Next uses localhost internally", () => {
+  const request = makeRequest("192.168.1.50:3000", "http://192.168.1.50:3000");
+  assert.equal(requestOrigin(request), "http://192.168.1.50:3000");
+  assert.equal(
+    requestOrigin(request, "http://localhost:3000/"),
+    "http://192.168.1.50:3000",
+  );
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(request, { websiteUrl: "http://localhost:3000/" }),
+  );
+});
+test("matches ports exactly and rejects cross-site and internal-address origins", () => {
+  for (const origin of [
+    "http://192.168.1.50:3001",
+    "https://192.168.1.50:3000",
+    "https://unrelated.example",
+    "http://localhost:3000",
+  ]) {
+    assert.throws(
+      () => verifyOrigin(makeRequest("192.168.1.50:3000", origin), {}),
+      /Invalid request origin/,
+    );
+  }
+});
+test("normalizes explicit public URLs and supports configured proxy origins", () => {
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(makeRequest("localhost:3000", "https://minegeo.example"), {
+      websiteUrl: "https://minegeo.example/",
+    }),
+  );
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(makeRequest("localhost:3000", "https://preview.example"), {
+      additionalOrigins: " https://preview.example/ , https://other.example ",
+    }),
+  );
+  assert.throws(
+    () =>
+      verifyOrigin(makeRequest("localhost:3000", "https://unrelated.example"), {
+        websiteUrl: "https://minegeo.example/",
+      }),
+    /Invalid request origin/,
+  );
+});
+test("forwarded hosts cannot authorize an unrelated origin", () => {
+  assert.throws(
+    () =>
+      verifyOrigin(
+        makeRequest("192.168.1.50:3000", "https://unrelated.example", {
+          "x-forwarded-host": "unrelated.example",
+          "x-forwarded-proto": "https",
+        }),
+        {},
+      ),
+    /Invalid request origin/,
+  );
+});
+
+test("login redirects preserve a configured public host's HTTPS scheme", () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    requestOrigin(makeRequest("minegeo.example"), "https://minegeo.example"),
+    "https://minegeo.example",
+  );
+});
+test("handles IPv6 and default ports without authorizing malformed authorities", () => {
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(makeRequest("[::1]:3000", "http://[::1]:3000"), {}),
+  );
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(
+      makeRequest("minegeo.example:80", "http://minegeo.example"),
+      {},
+    ),
+  );
+  for (const host of [
+    "trusted.example@unrelated.example",
+    "trusted.example/path",
+    "trusted.example,unrelated.example",
+    "trusted.example:invalid-port",
+  ])
+    assert.throws(
+      () => requestOrigin(makeRequest(host)),
+      /Invalid request origin/,
+    );
+});
+test("keeps Java JSON and bearer requests usable without a browser Origin", () => {
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() => verifyOrigin(makeRequest("localhost:3000"), {}));
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
+    verifyOrigin(
+      new Request(internalUrl, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { authorization: "Bearer test" },
+      }),
+      {},
+    ),
+  );
+  assert.throws(
+    () =>
+      verifyOrigin(
+        new Request(internalUrl, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+        }),
+        {},
+      ),
+    /JSON request required/,
+  );
+});
+test("opaque, credential-bearing, and path-bearing origins cannot bypass validation", () => {
+  for (const origin of [
+    "null",
+    "http://name:password@localhost:3000",
+    "http://localhost:3000/extra",
+    "http://localhost:3000?extra=1",
+  ]) {
+    assert.throws(
+      () => verifyOrigin(makeRequest("localhost:3000", origin), {}),
+      /Invalid request origin/,
+    );
+  }
+});